IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

GTECH CORPORATION,))
Plaintiff, v.)) Civil Action No. 04-138-JJF)
SCIENTIFIC GAMES INTERNATIONAL, INC., SCIENTIFIC GAMES HOLDINGS CORPORATION, SCIENTIFIC GAMES FINANCE CORPORATION, and SCIENTIFIC GAMES CORPORATION,)))))
Defendants.)))

GTECH'S OPPOSITION TO SCIENTIFIC GAMES' MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO PRECLUDE GTECH FROM CALLING MICHAEL DOLAN AS A WITNESS AT TRIAL

Dated: February 2, 2006 YOUNG, CONAWAY, STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP

Josy W. Ingersoll (#1088)

John Shaw (#3362)

Karen E. Keller (#4489)

Andrew A. Lundgren (#4429) The Brandywine Building

1000 West Street, 17th Floor

P.O. Box 391

Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Telephone: (302) 571-6600

Facsimile: (302) 571-1253

Of Counsel:

Thomas J. Meloro Larissa A. Soccoli Andrew Reibman KENYON & KENYON LLP

One Broadway

New York, New York 10004 Telephone: (212) 425-7200 Facsimile: (212) 425-5288

Douglas E. Ringel

KENYON & KENYON LLP

1500 K Street NW

Washington, DC 20005 Telephone: (202) 220-4200

Facsimile: (202) 220-4201

Attorneys for Plaintiff GTECH Corporation

Scientific Games seeks to preclude GTECH from offering testimony from a witness identified on its witness list, Michael Dolan, on the grounds that the disclosure was "belated" – i.e. not identified during the fact discovery period. Notably, Scientific Games nowhere cites any prejudice or trial disruption that would result from allowing Mr. Dolan to testify. That is because there is none.

GTECH initially identified a witness, Thomas Oram, during the fact discovery period as a person with knowledge of facts upon which GTECH intended to rely on a limited subject matter – GTECH's purchase of Scientific Games' on-line lottery business from Bally's Manufacturing, including technology used in Scientific Games' Iowa PAT. (See Ex. D to SciGames' Motion in Limine No. 4 at Response 21). Scientific Games agreed to defer deposing Mr. Oram until such time as GTECH identified him on its trial exhibit list. (See Exs. E and F to SciGames' Motion in Limine No. 4; SciGames' Brief at 2, fn.1). Thus, by Scientific Games' agreement, no discovery from a GTECH witness identified on this topic has yet occurred.

Scientific Games bases its request for preclusion on Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1), which states:

> (c) (1) A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (emphasis added).

Scientific Games does not reference the emphasized text in its brief, but this text is crucial here. The Rule 37 sanction only applies when the failure to supplement was "without substantial justification." Even if the failure was not substantially justified, a party should nevertheless be allowed to use the material that was not disclosed if the lack of earlier notice was

in question.

"harmless." See Advisory Committee Notes to 2000 Amendments, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. Subdivision (c).

There is substantial justification for GTECH's disclosure of Mr. Dolan at this stage and, more importantly, the lack of earlier notice is completely harmless. GTECH identified Mr. Dolan as a substitution for Mr. Oram on the exact same topic that Mr. Oram was identified. Since no deposition discovery has yet occurred concerning this topic from the GTECH witness identified to testify about it, and GTECH's offer to allow Scientific Games to depose Mr. Dolan prior to trial stands, there is simply no prejudice to Scientific Games from the identification of Mr. Dolan. Further, since the deposition of Mr. Dolan would take place on the same schedule as that which was proposed, and agreed to by Scientific Games, regarding Mr. Oram, there also is no prejudice or trial disruption from Mr. Dolan's identification and deposition at this point.

Notably, the two cases Scientific Games cites, Stambler v. RSA Sec., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 470, 471-72 (D. Del. 2003) and Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 457, 463 (D. Del. 2005), both rely on four Third Circuit factors for determining if a witness should be precluded from testifying based on failure to earlier disclose:

> ...(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact to the opposing party, (2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice, (3) the extent of disruption of the orderly and efficient trial of the case, and (4) the bad faith or willfulness of the non-compliance.

Scientific Games' insinuates that GTECH's service of a "revised witness list" on December 23, 2005, identifying Mr. Dolan, was somehow improper. (See Scientific Games' Brief at 2, ¶ 1). The parties stipulated to a schedule for exchange of pretrial materials [D.I.128] which provided for the initial exchange of witness lists and then a second exchange of revised lists. [D.I. 128 at ¶¶ 2 and 4] GTECH properly served its lists in accordance with that schedule and identified Mr. Dolan, as discussed below, as soon as GTECH became aware of his knowledge of the information

Stambler, 212 F.R.D. at 471 (citing Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Praxair, 231 F.R,D. at 463. Unlike in those cases, these factors are simply not met here.

Here there simply is no prejudice, nor does Scientific Games assert any. Mr. Dolan is identified as a "substitute" for a witness on the same topic, from whom, by agreement, no discovery has yet been taken. Allowing deposition of Mr. Dolan now – as GTECH has offered – would cure any "alleged" prejudice and would not cause any disruption of the trial. Scientific Games has already conceded that it does not believe taking one limited deposition on this topic prior to trial is prejudicial or disruptive since it agreed to do so for Mr. Oram. Finally, there is no willfulness connected with the disclosure at this time. GTECH identified Mr. Dolan promptly upon learning of his knowledge on the topic in question and identified him accordingly.

In these circumstances, the sanction of preclusion is extreme and unwarranted.

[T]he exclusion of otherwise admissible testimony because of a party's failure to meet a timing requirement is a harsh measure and should be avoided where possible.

Praxair, 231 F.R.D. at 463.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, GTECH respectfully requests that the Court deny Scientific

Games' motion in limine to preclude GTECH from calling Michael Dolan as a trial witness.

By:

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: February 2, 2006

Of Counsel:

Thomas J. Meloro Larissa A. Soccoli Andrew Reibman KENYON & KENYON LLP One Broadway New York, New York 10004

Telephone: (212) 425-7200 Facsimile: (212) 425-5288

Douglas E. Ringel KENYON & KENYON LLP 1500 K Street NW Washington, DC 20005 Telephone: (202) 220-4200 Facsimile: (202) 220-4201

Attorneys for Plaintiff GTECH Corporation

YOUNG, CONAWAY, STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP

Josy W. Ingersoll (#1088) John Shaw (#3362) Karen Keller (#4489)

Andrew A. Lundgren (#4429) The Brandywine Building

1000 West Street, 17th Floor P.O. Box 391

Wilmington, Delaware 19889 Telephone: (302) 571-6600 Facsimile: (302) 571-1253

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Andrew A. Lundgren, Esquire, hereby certify that on February 2, 2006, I caused to be electronically filed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification that such filing is available for viewing and downloading to the following counsel of record:

Jack B. Blumenfeld Esquire Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell 1201 North Market Street Wilmington, DE 19801

I further certify I caused a copy of the foregoing document to be served by hand delivery on the above-listed counsel of record.

YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP

Andrew A. Lundgren (Nd. 4429)

The Brandywine Building 1000 West Street, 17th Floor Wilmington, Delaware 19801

(302) 571-6600

alundgren @ycst.com

Attorneys for GTECH Corporation

DB01:1593591.1 063055.1001